

The Use of Pauses in Coercion: An Examination in Theory

**A Monograph
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Abstract

THE USE OF PAUSES IN COERCION: AN EXAMINATION IN THEORY by Maj Lisa A. Nemeth, USAF, 45 pages.

Coercion theory is traditionally segmented into compellence and deterrence. Recently theorists have begun to consider coercion comprehensively. This monograph continues that line of study and defines coercion as *the threat of, or use of, elements of national power to make an opponent choose to comply with the coercer's wishes*. This approach to coercion theory has allowed focus to shift to more applicable uses of coercion such as the use of coercion by a coalition or methods of application. In that line, this monograph studies the use of pauses within coercion theory. Pauses are defined as *a temporary halt to offensive operations for the purpose of bringing about conflict termination*. Existing theory, while mentioning the existence of a pause, does not discuss the effects the pause may have on the use of coercion. This paper fills that gap and forms a theoretical basis for the conduct of case studies to examine the hypothesis it presents.

As defined, pauses may be used to allow the target to reconsider his actions, as a temporary reward, or as an ultimatum presented to the target prior to an increase in the level of violence. Whatever the intention, an examination of theory indicates that pauses create negative consequences. First, they delay the defeat of the target by allowing reorganization, increases to his morale, and consequently, escalating his desire to resist. Secondly, pauses impact the credibility of the coercer by indicating he is restrained in his ability to use force. Finally pauses increase opportunities for the target to use counter-coercion. If the coercer is a coalition, theory indicates there is risk that all effects will be magnified. As a consequence of these counterproductive effects, this monograph urges caution if pauses will be used in coercion.

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INTRODUCTION

The use of intimidation of one kind or another in order to get others to comply with one's wishes is an everyday occurrence in human affairs.

—Alexander L. George, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*

The study of coercion theory in diplomatic affairs has varied in intensity over the last fifty years. Its origins began during the Cold War with the study of deterrence, yet after the Cold War ended, study was limited until the late 1990's. In some ways, this is understandable as the previous focus on coercion sought to deal with a nuclear and deterrence-oriented landscape. Nevertheless, in the late 1990's coercion experienced a revival in response to the many limited conflicts during the decade. After September 11, 2001, the landscape altered again. Coercion literature is just now starting to emerge reflecting the new environment. Regardless of the level of scholarly attention, the use of coercion in current international relations remains at levels arguably higher than during the Cold War. Unfortunately, even as existing coercion theory is applied to new situations, there are many basic questions unanswered.

One area that has been relatively ignored in coercion study is pauses in the use of force, specifically pauses designed to induce conflict termination. This is a tactic utilized multiple times in recent history, yet is virtually ignored in every study of coercion. At best, pauses are mentioned in passing, simply as an occurrence within a bombing campaign, not as significant events in themselves. Existing literature does not consider when or why a pause might be used in a limited conflict. Regardless of theory, pauses will likely be considered or used again in the future. This likelihood then begs the question: *do pauses in the use of force with the objective of achieving conflict termination have any effect?* Do they alter the use of coercion? Karl Mueller advocates that in the study of different strategies in coercion one must ask if they are “useful, worthless, or

counterproductive.”¹ This paper will examine if pauses affect coercion and in what manner. The answer is relevant as it may help policy-makers in their decision as to if a pause should be used to allow the target to reflect on his situation or if the coercer should continue his actions until the other side acquiesces to his demands.

This paper derives a hypothesis stating that consciously pausing to achieve conflict termination during a coercive engagement is counterproductive to the use of coercion. Pauses can delay the defeat of the target and damage the coercer’s credibility, both of which impact the use of coercion negatively in the existing conflict and in future conflicts. This research serves as a theoretical basis for further inquiry into the topic. The study does not examine pauses or coercion individually. Instead, it examines the theoretical effects of the use of pauses within existing coercion theory. It maintains a theoretical approach to the subject. Nevertheless, it will show that purposely using pauses in coercion is counter to coercion theory. Instead, the conscious use of pauses affects the situation in counterproductive ways hindering the further use of coercion and making it more difficult for the coercer to achieve his aim.

Plan of Monograph

This work introduces coercion theory to the reader starting with its historical foundations and progressing to more contemporary aspects. The aim of the literature review is to trace the evolution of thought regarding coercion from its origins. Out of this review, a definition of coercion will be presented in order to frame the exploration of pauses. This definition of coercion is necessary to prevent confusion as to which aspects of coercion a pause will relate to. This will be followed by the application of coercion theory in which deliberate pauses in the use of coercion will be defined. Finally, using existing coercion theory, the effects of pauses in the use

¹ Karl Mueller “Strategies of Coercion: Denial, Punishment, and the Future of Air Power.” *Security Studies* 7, no. 3 (Spring 1998): 205.

of military force will be examined showing the applicability of the concept. Case-studies to determine the validity of the presented hypothesis are beyond the scope of this monograph. The objective is therefore, to present a theoretical basis on the use of pauses in coercion from which a future case-study analysis could be conducted examining the presented hypothesis.

This study does not make a distinction between state and non-state actors and the use of coercion. In some instances, the selected wording may lead the reader to imply that only state actors are being discussed. However, a case can be made that some non-state actors may be capable of acting in a similar manner. An exploration of pauses in coercion to comparing state and non-state actors is an area that could be undertaken in a case-study analysis or as an area for further research.

COERCION THEORY

Origins

As a point of departure, coercion is the use of threats to change behavior.² Coercion theory developed from the usage of deterrence in the Cold War. However, it was not until 1966 with Thomas Schelling's influential work, *Arms and Influence*, did a general concept of coercion theory emerge beyond deterrence. For Schelling, deterrence was seen as passive action: a threat to

² This will be elaborated on further, but for now this definition is a simplified version of various theorists. Byman and Waxman define coercion as "getting an adversary to act in a certain way via anything short of brute force; the adversary must still have the capacity for organized violence but chose not to use it." They arrived at their definition after reading Pape who, in addition to addressing brute force, said that coercion "means efforts to change the behavior of a state by manipulating costs and benefits." Schelling does not outright give a definition of coercion, instead contrasting the concept with that of brute force to arrive at an understanding of what coercion is. Lawrence Freedman defines strategic coercion in a similar manner: "deliberate and purposive use of overt threats to influence another's strategic behavior." See Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might*. [Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2002], 3. Robert A. Pape *Bombing to Win*. [Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996], 4. Thomas C. Schelling *Arms and Influence*. [New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1966], 1-6. Lawrence Freedman *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998], 3.

keep an opponent from doing something.³ Initiative is placed on the opponent to take the first action triggering a response from the coercer.⁴ Deterrence did not create a comprehensive picture of coercion, leading Schelling to introduce the concept of compellence. In contrast to deterrence, compellence shifts the initiative for the first action to the coercer.⁵ Whereas deterrence is waiting in hope of not seeing a response, compellence is active, thereby, “*inducing* his withdrawal, or his acquiescence, or his collaboration by an action that threatens to hurt.”⁶ In contrasting deterrence with compellence, Walter Peterson, who examined the differences between the two, compares deterrence to drawing a line and acting only if the target crosses it.⁷ In contrast, compellence “requires that the punishment be administered *until* the other acts rather than *if* he acts” as in deterrence.⁸ As Petersen asserts, the coercer “must force the defending target out of a position that it currently holds” when using compellence.⁹ Compellence then, is about action: action to communicate the threat, action threatening damage, and again action causing the damage if compliance is not achieved. Coercion composed of both compellence and deterrence is about action and inaction.¹⁰

Not all warfare is coercive. A war with intent to destroy, to defeat on pure strength becomes a battle of brute force; a war with the intent of forcing compliance becomes coercive

³ Thomas C. Schelling *Arms and Influence*. [New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1966], 67.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 70.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 71.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 80. Emphasis original

⁷ Walter J. Petersen “Deterrence and Compellence: A Critical Assessment of Conventional Wisdom,” *International Studies Quarterly* 30, no. 3 (September 1986) <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600418> [accessed January 6, 2009]: 282.

⁸ Thomas C. Schelling *Arms and Influence*. [New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1966], 70-71. Emphasis original

⁹ Walter J. Petersen “Deterrence and Compellence: A Critical Assessment of Conventional Wisdom,” *International Studies Quarterly* 30, no. 3 (September 1986) <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600418> [accessed January 6, 2009]: 282.

warfare.¹¹ Schelling states that coercive warfare does not just include the threat of violence, but the threat of further violence—in a progressive manner—if compliance is not forthcoming.¹² In coercive warfare, the use and intensity of force must be increased over time in order to gradually raise the costs of non-compliance. This situation where force gradually increases in response to non-compliance would later become what Robert Pape would term a risk strategy.¹³ Finally, Schelling notes that because destruction is not the intention, the pace of coercive warfare is likely to be set by diplomacy rather than the battle itself, often causing the warfare to appear restrained.¹⁴

While revered as an illuminating work on deterrence and credited for the foundations of compellence, Schelling's work is not without critique. One shortcoming is the failure to incorporate social science concepts such as organizational behavior or influence into his theory.¹⁵ The enduring and most significant criticism however, is that Schelling does not create a theory that is useable in response to real-world events. However, it has been advocated that this was never Schelling's intent—instead he presents “a set of analytical questions...so as to arrive at better solutions to our own problems.”¹⁶

¹⁰ Similar discussion regarding action and inaction can also be found in Lawrence Freedman *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998], 19.

¹¹ See discussion. Thomas C. Schelling *Arms and Influence*. [New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1966], 3-4 and 171-3.

¹² *Ibid.*, 171-3.

¹³ As Pape states on page 66: “The heart of this strategy is to raise the risk of civilian damage slowly, compelling the opponent to concede to avoid suffering future costs.” This does not prevent military targets from being attacked, but as the intensity increases, targets from all sets are considered: military, economic, political, etc. Robert A. Pape *Bombing to Win*. [Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996], 66-69.

¹⁴ Thomas C. Schelling *Arms and Influence*. [New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1966], 172-3.

¹⁵ Harold Guetzkow, review of *Arms and Influence* by Thomas Schelling. *American Sociological Review* 31, no. 6 (December 1966). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2091699> [accessed January 6, 2009], 889.

¹⁶ Laurence W. Martin, review of *Arms and Influence* by Thomas Schelling. *The American Political Science Review* 61, no. 3 (September 1967). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1976097> [accessed January 6, 2009], 767.

Whereas Schelling advocated a conceptual theory of compellence and coercive warfare where diplomats might set the pace, Alexander George and William Simons worked to create a diplomatic strategy of coercion, an empirical theory they called coercive diplomacy. Coercive diplomacy is different than Schelling's concept of coercive warfare in that coercive diplomacy is narrower:

[Coercive Diplomacy] is essentially a diplomatic strategy, one that relies on the threat of force rather than the use of force. If force must be used to strengthen diplomatic efforts at persuasion, it is employed in an exemplary manner, in the form of quite limited military action, to demonstrate resolution and willingness to escalate to high levels of military action if necessary.¹⁷

George positions coercive diplomacy as a subset of coercion and compellence. He viewed it as encompassing “defensive” compellent actions only: to force a target to stop or reverse action already taken, rather than an offensive goal of forcing them to do something.¹⁸ Coercive diplomacy also emphasizes flexibility—the flexibility to “encourage” or “work out an acceptable compromise”—rather than using only force to threaten.¹⁹ Coercive diplomacy is a “complex political-diplomatic strategy” where if force is used, it is used to protect interests and “the credibility of one’s determination to use more force if necessary.”²⁰ Coercive diplomacy essentially is the embodiment of a “carrot and stick” philosophy: motivation is used to induce your target to submit to your wishes, while appearing threatening at the same time.

In the development of George and Simons’ theory of coercive deterrence, they determine eight conditions that indicate whether coercive diplomacy might be a viable option. The eight variables that favor coercive diplomacy are: clarity of the objective, strength of motivation,

¹⁷ Alexander L. George, “Introduction: The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy,” in *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, ed. Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds. 2nd Rev. ed. [Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc. 1994], 2.

¹⁸ Alexander L. George, “Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics,” in *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, ed. Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds. 2nd Rev. ed. [Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc. 1994], 7

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 7.

asymmetry of motivation, sense of urgency, strong leadership, adequate domestic and international support, unacceptability of threatened escalation, and clarity concerning precise terms of the settlement of the crisis.²¹ Of the eight, George and Simons deem three especially significant, dealing with the opponent's perception: asymmetry of motivation, sense of urgency, and unacceptability of threatened escalation.²² The first, asymmetry of motivation, recognizes that the coercer must appear to be more motivated by the issues at stake than his target. The importance of the issue's valuation as a central tenet has been confirmed by later studies.²³ While acknowledging that sometimes the perception is controlled by the conflict itself, George and Simons posit that the coercer might be able to create an asymmetry with his demands and actions.²⁴ However this creation of asymmetry occurs, it is the instillation of the *belief* that is important. Similarly, it is vital for the coercer to appear to have a pressing need to end the conflict to create a sense of urgency to comply from the target.²⁵ The final significant factor is the creation of a fear of escalation in the target. The target must believe that by not complying, the consequences would be worse than if they agreed.²⁶ The thread between each of these three variables is the creation of a belief in the mind of the target. It is what the target believes, not necessarily what exists that is crucial.

²⁰ Ibid., 12.

²¹ For further description, see Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, "Findings and Conclusions," in *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, ed. Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds. 2nd Rev. ed. [Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc. 1994], 279-287.

²² Ibid., 287.

²³ See Vesna Danilovic. "The Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 3 (June 2001). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3176149> [accessed January 6, 2009], 365-366.

²⁴ George and Simons list two ways that the asymmetry could be created: limiting demands to that which is not a vital interest of the target and by offering carrots to reduce resistance. See Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, "Findings and Conclusions," in *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, ed. Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds. 2nd Rev. ed. [Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc. 1994], 281.

²⁵ Ibid., 282.

Schelling along with George and Simons laid the foundations of coercion theory. Schelling initiated the academic concept with his expansion of coercion beyond deterrence, while George and Simons worked to create a model that could be applied in practical situations. Both introduced key concepts that would be built upon by future theorists. Schelling's conceptualization of coercion as comprised of deterrence and compellence launched two paths of study: one which maintained the distinction and another that blended them together into a general concept of coercion. George and Simons' empirical model identified eight variables that must be considered when using coercion. This led future studies to develop further principles and likewise further develop coercion theory in hopes of creating guidelines for the application of coercion in real-world situations.

Recent Developments

Deterrence will go on being our main business, compellence the exception.
—Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*

Denial Strategies and Robert Pape

Schelling and George and Simons developed their theories within the context of the Cold War. Deterrence was then an everyday occurrence; compellence was not. Consequently, most studies focused on the deterrence side of coercion. After the Cold War ended, the focus of coercion altered and in the late 1990's coercion theorists began to examine different aspects of coercion: non-nuclear situations, compellence, and coercion holistically without the divide between deterrence and compellence.²⁷

²⁶ Ibid., 285.

²⁷ Recently there has been a call to re-examine deterrence in post-Cold War scenarios. See Lawrence Freedman. *Deterrence*. [Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2004].

One of the first of these was Robert Pape who focused on compellence. In his study of coercion, Pape focused on how to apply coercion in warfare—where should the threat or “hurt” of coercion be applied. To do this Pape studied instances of air power in war, specifically strategic bombing, as the means of force application to coerce. Pape selected air power because from the onset of a conflict, air power is able to focus on “specific categories of targets, attacking either political, economic, population, or military targets in isolation or combination” or even subsets of these; additionally, air power presents a low-cost option when compared with land-forces.²⁸

Pape defined coercion as “efforts to change the behavior of a state by manipulating costs and benefits.”²⁹ In doing so, he solidified a framework that can be used to analyze coercion. Solidified is an apt descriptor, because aspects of his cost-benefit framework were previously described, albeit less explicitly, by Schelling and also by George and Simons.³⁰ In the mid-1980’s Walter Petersen analyzed different coercive situations and determined that “defending targets and challenging initiators base their decisions on factors such as their expected costs of war and estimates of their opponent’s costs.”³¹ Petersen did not examine benefits, only relative costs. Instead of comparing relatively between the target and coercer, Pape uses evaluation an internal to each participant to determine the costs and the benefits of resisting or coercing for the target and coercer respectively. Pape then takes this framework and uses it to determine what type of strategy should be followed to raise the costs of resistance above the benefits of continued conflict for the target. Pape uses air power to examine these different strategies of coercion.

²⁸ Robert A. Pape *Bombing to Win*. [Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996], 45.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 4.

³⁰ For example in Schelling: “costs him less”. Thomas C. Schelling *Arms and Influence*. [New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1966], 4.

³¹ Walter J. Petersen “Deterrence and Compellence: A Critical Assessment of Conventional Wisdom,” *International Studies Quarterly* 30, no. 3 (September 1986) <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600418> [accessed January 6, 2009]: 280.

Before he could examine strategies, Pape needed to define what substantiated a coercive success. Again his definition was rooted in terms of cost-benefit analysis: the goal of coercion is the same as in war, but should be achieved “at less cost to both sides”.³² Consequently, the earlier the target surrenders, the more successful the coercion.³³ Successful coercion occurs when a target could continue to fight, but chooses not to. In terms of cost-benefit, the costs of surrendering are lower than those of continuing to fight.³⁴

With success thus defined, Pape began a strategy analysis that has sparked much debate and further study.³⁵ Considering only situations where the use of force had already been decided upon, Pape examined one question: what strategy, or method, of applying coercive force was best for success? Pape examined four strategies: denial, punishment, risk and decapitation.³⁶ He found that coercing via strategic bombing was difficult, and regardless of which strategy was followed, did not achieve its goals 100 percent of the time.³⁷ However, the results indicated that use of a denial strategy—preventing the target’s ability to achieve his goals via military options was the only method of coercion that could reliably produce success. Punishment failed because states

³² Robert A. Pape *Bombing to Win*. [Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996], 13.

³³ Specifically: “Surrender long before complete military defeat should be regarded as an outstanding coercive success. By contrast surrender only shortly before defeat should be considered only a minor success.” Ibid., 15.

³⁴ Ibid., 16.

³⁵ See Michael Horowitz and Dan Reiter. “When Does Aerial Bombing Work?: Quantitative Empirical Tests, 1917-1999.” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 2 (April 2001). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3176274> [accessed August 14, 2008]; John A. Warden, III. “Success in Modern War: A Response to Robert Pape’s *Bombing To Win*.” *Security Studies* 7, no. 2 (Winter 1997/98); Robert A. Pape *Bombing to Win*. [Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996]; and Barry D Watts, “Ignoring Reality: Problems of Theory and Evidence in Security Studies.” *Security Studies* 7, no. 2 (Winter 1997/98).

³⁶ Denial, attacking the target’s military so that they are not capable of achieving their goals; Punishment, attacking the civilian population thereby raising the overall cost of achieving their goals; Risk, slowing increasing the civilian damage; and Decapitation, targeting key nodes such as leadership, communications, and infrastructure. Robert A. Pape *Bombing to Win*. [Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996], 15-18 and 56.

³⁷ Ibid., 314-315.

were often willing to accept the costs in the process of achieving their goals.³⁸ Risk strategies failed because they were slower, weaker forms of punishment strategies and often gave the appearance of a lack of resolve on the coercer due to their restraint.³⁹ Decapitation was determined to be very difficult to implement and the results of leadership changes too unpredictable to be a successful strategy.⁴⁰ Predictably, Pape's analysis was not without controversy.

Setting aside Pape's discussion about strategic bombing effectiveness as it is not relevant to this discussion, Pape's conclusion that denial is the only viable strategy to follow in coercion has drawn criticism. Barry Watts and Karl Mueller both argue that combinations of the strategies need to be considered, as in reality, combinations are often pursued.⁴¹ Even within Pape's categories, Mueller argues that Pape's definitions of his categories are too restrictive. Especially relevant is Mueller's critique on punishment and risk. Mueller argues that Pape's definitions ignore other targeting strategy options available to the coercer. For example, what if the punishment strategy was "to raise the enemy's expected costs of resistance without actually attacking or tormenting the civilian populace, [but] by destroying or threatening things that the state, its citizens, or its leaders value?"⁴² This would not fit within Pape's framework yet, as Mueller notes: "coercive strategies to threaten what the enemy values represent the very essence

³⁸ Ibid., 21. He also lists 5 more reasons why Punishment fails: national cohesion, willingness to accept higher costs during war, punishment often inflicts only limited damage on civilians, ability to minimize civilian damage, unlikelihood of citizenry turning against government. See pages 21-26.

³⁹ Ibid., 18, 28-29.

⁴⁰ See discussion. Ibid., 79-86.

⁴¹ Barry D Watts, "Ignoring Reality: Problems of Theory and Evidence in Security Studies." *Security Studies* 7, no. 2 (Winter 1997/98): 147-149. And Karl Mueller "Strategies of Coercion: Denial, Punishment, and the Future of Air Power." *Security Studies* 7, no. 3 (Spring 1998): 190, 218-220.

⁴² Karl Mueller "Strategies of Coercion: Denial, Punishment, and the Future of Air Power." *Security Studies* 7, no. 3 (Spring 1998): 216.

of coercion as envisioned by Thomas Schelling and others.”⁴³ Finally, both argue that Pape’s study does not consider second-order effects from the targeting strategy.⁴⁴

Pape and his critics worked to fill a void in coercion theory. Together, they all seek to expand practical knowledge of how to best apply coercion for success. Reductionist accusations toward Pape may or may not be correct. However the ensuing debate over his results has only served to broaden knowledge of the practical side of coercion, especially in non-nuclear scenarios.⁴⁵ With the end of the Cold War, the Gulf War and the ensuing wars in the Balkans, Pape was at the beginning as the study of coercion remerged. As with Pape, this time coercion theory was not centered on deterrence.

Coercive Diplomacy, Updated

In the last ten years, the study of coercion has been wide-ranging. The debate has switched focus from definitions, sub-categorization, and strategies, to what characteristics coercion must employ to be successful. Real-world events have expanded the discussion through the use of coalitions and alliances, economic sanctions and other means of coercion besides military force. Many theorists have also worked to make coercion applicable in a limited-war, post-Cold War context, where nuclear weapons was not the primary consideration. Coercion theory needed to match the contemporary operating environment.

To make the theory applicable in today’s environment, Peter Viggo Jakobsen, a prominent Danish coercion theorist, used George and Simmons’ coercive diplomacy as a basis. As the original concept of coercive diplomacy was primarily a cold-war interstate model,

⁴³ Ibid., 216.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 219-220. Watts approaches this argument via complexity and non-linearity. See Barry D Watts, “Ignoring Reality: Problems of Theory and Evidence in Security Studies.” *Security Studies* 7, no. 2 (Winter 1997/98): 118-123 and 159-164.

⁴⁵ For an open debate on Bombing to Win, see *Security Studies* 7 no 2 (Winter 1997/98) and no 3 (Spring 1998).

Jakobsen reconstructs it to apply to coalitions, fragmented (non-unitary) opponents, and situations where the opponent is already using force.⁴⁶ Despite the inclusion of the other factors, his primary focus is on the use of coalitions. He advocates that this update is necessary because of the increasing usage of coercion by the United Nations and consequent danger to its personnel⁴⁷ Jakobsen examines each of George and Simons' eight conditions to indicate success and reformulates each to apply to his new model.⁴⁸ In some cases he renames the original criteria to give more specificity in what is desired. Other criteria from George and Simons are combined into two new criteria: threaten to defeat adversary quickly with little cost and useable military options. This not only is more specific but also allows the criteria to be examined prior to or during a crisis as opposed to after.⁴⁹ Finally, certain criteria are given different emphasis in Jakobsen's model from the original. For example, strong leadership is deemed even more essential with coalitions as a strong leader is needed to convince multiple nations and governments of the direction.

⁴⁶ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "The Strategy of Coercive Diplomacy: Refining Existing Theory to Post-Cold War Realities." in *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases* edited by Lawrence Freedman. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998], 63. George and Simmons did introduce coalitions in their 1994 edition. However, their discussion of coalitions is extremely limited. See Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, "Findings and Conclusions," in *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, ed. Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds. 2nd Rev. ed. [Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc. 1994], 273. Jakobsen's concept of fragmented opponent refers to what he terms "non-unitary" actors. He refers to Yugoslavia and Somalia as examples and does not further elaborate. It can be inferred from his writing that he intends fragmented opponents to cover state and non-state actors that are not capable of single control over their armed forces. See pages 63, 70 and 76.

⁴⁷ Specifically his reasons are: "1) that the UN is increasingly employing coercive diplomacy against opponents who have used force; 2) that there is every indication that they UN will be confronted with opponents of this kind in the future; 3) that such use of coercive diplomacy involves great risks to UN personnel...". Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "The Strategy of Coercive Diplomacy: Refining Existing Theory to Post-Cold War Realities." in *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases* edited by Lawrence Freedman. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998], 71.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 76-80. Jakobsen's criteria are: Clear demand, Strong leadership, Threaten to defeat adversary quickly with little cost, Usable military options, Use of ultimatum, Assurance against future demands, Domestic Support, International Support, Use of Carrot.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 78.

George and Simons felt their model of coercive diplomacy was useful to determine if a coercive diplomacy strategy was appropriate.⁵⁰ Jakobsen advocates his variant is more practical; by creating a framework that can be used in real-time as opposed to one that is best used to examine history, Jakobsen envisions his variant of coercive diplomacy as “at best a guide to policy-making, a checklist of factors that need to be taken into account.”⁵¹ Like George and Simons, he does not feel his framework should be a guide on how to conduct coercive diplomacy but he does state that policy-makers need to emphasize four aspects: “a capability and will to threaten force to defeat the opponent quickly with little cost, use of ultimata, and use of carrots to increase the opponent’s incentive to comply.”⁵² For Jakobsen, these four are essential to the conduct of coercive diplomacy. While Jakobsen chose to start with an existing model and update it, others were still interested in the overall theory of coercion.

Scoping

Much recent writing on coercion considers what can only be termed “scoping”. Scoping is an apt description as many theorists are attempting to define what coercion theory includes, or rather, where its boundaries lie. Does it include the actual use of force or only the threat? Does it include non-military threats? Is bargaining with the target including the use of carrots still considered coercion? Can deterrence and compellence be used at the same time? Unfortunately there is no consensus on answers to these questions. As with George and Simons who coined “coercive diplomacy”, one solution to the bounding of coercion has been to create individual theories of coercion with differentiating names.

⁵⁰ Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, “Findings and Conclusions,” in *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, ed. Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds. 2nd Rev. ed. [Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc. 1994], 292-293.

⁵¹ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “The Strategy of Coercive Diplomacy: Refining Existing Theory to Post-Cold War Realities,” in *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases* edited by Lawrence Freedman. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998], 80.

Lawrence Freedman is such an example with his concept of “strategic coercion”. Freedman defines it as “deliberate and purposive use of overt threats to influence another’s strategic choices.”⁵³ He chose to distinguish his concept of coercion because he felt constrained by the existing concepts and definitions of deterrence, compellence and coercive diplomacy.⁵⁴ To fully explain, a detour discussion must first be made regarding the use of force in coercion.

A large portion of recent debate relates to whether coercion extends to situations that use actual force and if so, how much. In its origins, as discussed earlier with Schelling, coercion is not just the threat of force, but the threat of more force. The distinction being explored in coercion is not if force will be used, but to what extent. For Schelling, coercion is exceeded and no longer being used when brute force is used in “taking what you want.”⁵⁵ George and Simons, as mentioned previously, minimized force to only that which would demonstrate resolve. Many theorists do not agree with this limitation. The current trend in defining the use of force is better aligned with Schelling’s original view. As illustrated by Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, coercion “is the use of threatened force including the limited use of actual force....”⁵⁶ For them, as with others, “limited” refers to force short of Schelling’s brute force. Yet, this definition still does not clearly delineate where coercion ends. Further indications can be found in Freedman’s invocation of the difference between control and coercion. For Freedman, control and coercion are distinguished from each other by the defining characteristic of coercion: that the target has a

⁵² Ibid., 84.

⁵³ Lawrence Freedman *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998], 3.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 3-4 and 15-19.

⁵⁵ Thomas C. Schelling *Arms and Influence*. [New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1966], 2.

⁵⁶ Daniel L Byman, Matthew C. Waxman, and Eric Larson. *Air Power as a Coercive Instrument*. [Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1999], 10.

choice.⁵⁷ In using force to control, choice is taken away from the target; consequently, force used becomes brute force and is no longer coercive. Therefore coercion is being used, no matter the level of force, as long as the opponent still retains a choice.⁵⁸

Returning to Freedman's concept of strategic coercion, the above discussion illustrates why he does not make a distinction between the threat and use of force. As long as the use of force is coercive, it is included. Freedman also is unable to make a distinction between offense and defense, unlike George did, as well as between deterrence and compellence. In doing so, Freedman continues a point initiated by Schelling over deterring the "continuance of something the opponent is already doing."⁵⁹ In this situation, since deterrence has already failed and the opponent has taken action, deterrence alone is no longer sufficient and a compellent action must be next; therefore, the overall coercive behaviors are then comprised of both compellent and deterrent actions and there is not a need to limit the definition of coercion to just one aspect.⁶⁰ While there may be coercive situations that are pure deterrence or pure compellence, many will include both. Hence, an inclusive definition of coercion allows a comprehensive strategy to be applied that may involve both deterrent and compellent behaviors.

While Freedman chooses to examine all forms of coercion as intertwined, Gary Schaub, Jr., author of "Compellence: Resuscitating the Concept", argues that in order to fully understand and apply coercion the different types must be studied individually. Schaub then returns to the traditional framework by examining coercion in its four parts: deterrence, compellence, offense,

⁵⁷ Lawrence Freedman *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998], 22. Freedman is using the distinction between control and coercion in a discussion of the linkage between coercion and diplomacy however, as shown, the concept of choice can also distinguish limited from brute force.

⁵⁸ Applicable for situations of non-nuclear, limited war. Nuclear scenarios are beyond the scope of this paper.

⁵⁹ Lawrence Freedman *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998], 19.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 19.

and defense. In his view, deterrence and compellence are both based on the threat of force with the goal serving as the distinction between the two: to either maintain or change the status quo, respectively.⁶¹ Defense is like deterrence with its maintaining status goal, but occurs when force is actually used; offense is likewise paired with compellence.⁶² For Schaub, if we are to understand how to use threats in international relations we must look at deterrence and compellence separately.⁶³ The distinction between the four segments is crucial for practitioners. If a coercer is planning on using compellence, they must be prepared for the threat to fail and already be thinking about offense—the actual use of force instead of just threats to gain compliance. They must consider the consequences if they fail.⁶⁴ Accordingly, Schaub’s argument is that each category of coercion must be studied separately to fully create an understanding of how to successfully apply each individually and in combination.

Aside from the theorists “scoping” what coercion is and includes, there are others trying to make the theory applicable to the manner with which it operates today on the international stage. Jakobsen was just one example. These theorists are concerned with concepts such as coalitions, domestic constraints, and the use of other pressures besides military force. These concepts will be discussed later as they relate to pauses.

Summary

The study of coercion has expanded since its origins with Schelling during the Cold War. Old and new theorists are still struggling to arrive at a unified concept while others are working to

⁶¹ Schaub, Gary Jr. “Compellence: Resuscitating the Concept.” in *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases* edited by Lawrence Freedman. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998], 44.

⁶² Ibid., 44.

⁶³ Ibid., 39. Schaub then dedicates his essay to the creation of success correlates for compellence. His essay is a call for further study of compellence.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 55. He places this concept under a discussion of how clear the communication of demands should be. For Schaub, the clarity depends on the situation and how much resolve the coercer possesses.

make it practical. There is still much up for debate. For the purposes of this paper, there will not be a distinction between compellence and deterrence, nor between offense and defense. Nevertheless, pauses will be defined in terms of action, and thus lead the reader to equate them with compellence. Generally, this is a correct association. However, it is possible to have a situation where pauses could be utilized to deter changes in an on-going action; consequently, pauses will be discussed in terms of overall coercion.

Earlier, as a starting point, coercion was defined as the use of threats to change behavior. Due to the differing perspectives of various theorists, the definition needs further elaboration to focus the discussion on pauses. Coercion, then, is defined as *the threat of, or use of, elements of national power to make an opponent choose to comply with the coercer's wishes*. It is a broad definition of coercion, but bounds the concept by including both threats and actual use of force. It also implies a success criterion in that the opponent must choose to comply. This removes brute force and control as methods of success. This definition includes the use of incentives, but does not mandate them. Finally, since coercion is defined in terms of the elements of national power, military force becomes merely one aspect of coercion. Although this definition contains more than just military options, this paper will only explore situations where the use of the military element of national power has already been initiated during a coercive action.

PAUSES IN COERCION THEORY

The ideal compellent action would be one that, once initiated, causes minimal harm if compliance is forthcoming, is consistent with the time schedule of feasible compliance, is beyond recall once initiated, and cannot be stopped by the party that started it but automatically stops upon compliance, with all this fully understood by the adversary.

—Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*

While the communications aspect is extremely important to coercion, Schaub misses a bigger point hidden in the concept of failure: the credibility of the coercer. Credibility will be discussed shortly.

Schelling's definition of the ideal compellent action does not mention a pause. In fact, it says just the opposite: action must continue until compliance. Schelling realized this ideal definition was unlikely to occur due to constraints on the compeller and the risks involved with setting an irreversible action into motion.⁶⁵ Regardless of the ideal, nations often look for a way to bring the conflict to an end quickly. One method that has been utilized to do so is a pause.

What are pauses and why use them?

Definition

The use of the term “pause” can have many different implications. The dictionary defines it as a temporary stop, but in terms of international conflict it may refer to an operational pause or a strategic pause.⁶⁶ In its scant existence in coercion literature, the term is not defined as it is often an auxiliary to the main topic. For the context of this paper, a pause has a very specific definition. *A pause is a temporary halt to offensive operations for the purpose of bringing about conflict termination.* Only offensive operations are paused, defensive operations may still occur. It also does not include offensive pauses for other reasons such as what is commonly referred to in the military as an ‘operational pause’—a temporary halt in operations—often prior to or due to exceeding supply lines, to rearm or refit, or to allow the sequencing or alignment of different operations.⁶⁷ The pauses referred to in this paper are pauses in operations specifically for the strategic reason of inducing conflict termination. They are also unilateral, meaning only the coercer—and if applicable, his coalition—pause. The target may have no prior notice of the

⁶⁵ Thomas C. Schelling *Arms and Influence*. [New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1966], 89.

⁶⁶ Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pause> accessed 18 Jan 09.

⁶⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operation Planning*. [26 December 2006], IV-32.

pause. These two features differentiate it from what is commonly thought of as a cease-fire.⁶⁸ There is not a designated length for the pause. It could be multiple days or less than one, or it could even be longer, possibly measured in weeks. The length is at the discretion of the coercer, who can continue it as long as it is serving his purposes. Finally, the pause may or may not be announced even after it has started. The key to this concept of a pause is that the intent of the coercer in initiating the pause is to encourage conflict resolution.⁶⁹

Why Pause

A coercer may implement a pause for many reasons. The first consideration is to provide an opportunity for the target to reconsider his defiance. As Pape states: “The coercer may interrupt the operations temporarily in order to provide time for reflection or negotiations.”⁷⁰ During the pause the target is expected to realize the impact and pain from the coercive actions. The pause is intended to give a respite that allows the target to decide that he does not want the action to restart. As the desired result, the target acquiesces to the coercer’s demands. A pause in this manner can be found in a list of classical principles that can be used in obtaining successful war termination.⁷¹ Another reason for a pause is to send a signal to the target. This signal can cover many messages. It may serve as a reward if the target met part of the coercer’s demands.⁷²

⁶⁸ Although it could be considered as a unilateral cease-fire.

⁶⁹ Pauses linked with conflict termination are not new. Schelling discusses pauses as a means to an armistice or stopping a conflict. However, his focus is on the creation of the pause and ending the conflict rather than the pause itself. See Thomas C. Schelling *Arms and Influence*. [New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1966], 204-212. In his discussion on risk strategies, Pape, states that “the coercer may interrupt the operations temporarily in order to provide time for reflection or negotiation or to reward the target state for concessions...” Robert A. Pape *Bombing to Win*. [Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996], 18-19. Here it is the focus specifically on the pause that is unique.

⁷⁰ Robert A. Pape *Bombing to Win*. [Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996], 19.

⁷¹ James W. Reed, “Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning,” *Parameters* 23, no. 2 (Summer 1993). <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/1993/reed.htm> [accessed July 29, 2008]; under “The State of the Art”.

⁷² Robert A. Pape *Bombing to Win*. [Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996], 19.

Similarly, it could also be implemented as a goodwill gesture to signal that the coercer does not desire the complete destruction of the target, instead only desiring the demands already made. While the pause does not prove this intent, it does indicate to the target that he still has a choice in the matter. The final reason a pause might be used is to indicate the impending crossing of a threshold. In this case, a coercer might pause in his attacks prior to altering the conflict, which normally occurs before raising the level of violence. A pause in this manner may be intended as a signal to the target of the new level of punishment that will follow and is often a readily identified place to pause on the part of the coercer.⁷³ Depending on the scale of the conflict, a pause prior to escalation may be recognizable by the target. However that may not always be the case. The target may not realize that the coercer is consciously pausing operations. Consequently, for the target to realize what is at stake in any pause scenario identified here, the coercer may have to identify via further threat, i.e., what comes after the pause, if there is no resolution.

Fred Charles Iklé in his seminal work on war termination, *Every War Must End*, mentions one other factor in a discussion of internal political considerations and their effect on conflict termination that must be considered in conjunction with pauses. Iklé states that often “government leaders vehemently oppose negotiating with the enemy as long as the fighting continues.”⁷⁴ He then lists several reasons for this: the desire to talk would indicate weakness, fear that the military’s efforts would weaken if they felt a conclusion was near, fear that negotiated proposals would fall short of goals, and fear of the effect negotiations may have on any allies.⁷⁵ Even though he was not specifically discussing coercive engagement-type scenarios, Iklé’s points are still valid. The target may not be willing to submit to demands or even discuss

⁷³ Thomas C. Schelling *Arms and Influence*. [New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1966], 135.

⁷⁴ Fred Charles Iklé. *Every War Must End*. 2nd Rev. ed. [New York: Columbia University Press, 2005], 85.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 85-86.

them while the fighting is still on-going for the exact reasons Iklé listed. Each of these reasons can affect the target's ability to conduct the war, but as Iklé also mentions, a government's real fear may be their loss of power.⁷⁶ Negotiations or asking for negotiations while still fighting may energize the population or military to overthrow their 'weak' government. By offering a pause, the coercer potentially can offer the target a way out of this dilemma.

A Pause and the Carrot

As mentioned, a pause can be used as a response for the target's compliance with a demand. It may serve solely as an act of goodwill in response, but it may also be used as a reward. However, a pause as a reward can lead to confusion with the concept of carrots, also known as incentives or positive sanctions, as introduced in the discussion on coercive diplomacy. A pause, while very similar, is not the same as an incentive. According to David Baldwin, author of "The Power of Positive Sanctions", a positive sanction is an "actual or promised improvement in B's [the target's] value position relative to his baseline of expectations."⁷⁷ David Cortright has a more detailed definition in that an incentive is "the granting of a political or economic benefit in exchange for a specific policy adjustment by the recipient nation."⁷⁸ It is a reward for a change in behavior that is often designed to "make cooperation and conciliation more attractive than aggression and hostility."⁷⁹ Unfortunately, the confusion with a pause is easy to see as Cortright continues: "ending a negative sanction may be considered a positive incentive."⁸⁰ Baldwin elaborates on this concept by saying that imposing a negative sanction can create the opportunity

⁷⁶ Ibid., 86.

⁷⁷ David L Baldwin, "The Power of Positive Sanctions." *World Politics* 24, no. 1 (October 1971). <http://www.jstor.org/pss/2009705> [accessed January 19, 2009], 23.

⁷⁸ David Cortright, "Incentives and Cooperation in International Affairs." in *The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention*. edited by David Cortright, [Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997], 6.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 6.

for a positive sanction via the ending of the negative sanctions.⁸¹ Even with this statement, it is possible and important to differentiate a pause from a carrot. Take the situation where a pause is implemented in response to the target complying with some of the coercer's demands in hopes that he will comply with the rest. In this scenario, the negative sanction (here the overall coercive military action) will end upon full acquiescence. However, the pause is not the final end-state. The implication with the pause, a *temporary* condition, is that a *permanent* halt to the activity will occur upon full compliance. The pause is not an incentive in itself, but a glimpse of a possible future—a *temporary* incentive at best. It may best fit with Cortright's use of the term inducement in that a pause is intended to overcome resistance through persuasion by offering a sample of what conflict termination would entail.⁸² A pause may persuade the target of what may happen, but it can only serve as a temporary incentive albeit with the coercer's hope of it becoming permanent.

The Pause as an Ultimatum

Prior to any military action, the coercer likely issued an ultimatum to the target as a final attempt at resolving the situation. This ultimatum would consist of a demand, a threat and a time limit.⁸³ The demands are the actions the coercer requires to resolve the situation. The threat attached to the original ultimatum may have been specific or general depending on the desires of the coercer. Finally, a time limit would be presented to give a sense of urgency. Since the

⁸⁰ Ibid., 7.

⁸¹ David L Baldwin, "The Power of Positive Sanctions." *World Politics* 24, no. 1 (October 1971). <http://www.jstor.org/pss/2009705> [accessed January 19, 2009], 25.

⁸² David Cortright, "Incentives and Cooperation in International Affairs." in *The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention*. edited by David Cortright, [Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997], 6

⁸³ Schaub, Gary Jr. "Compellence: Resuscitating the Concept." in *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases* edited by Lawrence Freedman. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998], 44. And also Paul Gordon Lauren. "Ultimata and Coercive Diplomacy." *International Studies Quarterly* 16, no. 2 (June 1972). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3013977> [accessed January 6, 2009], 137.

threatened action was taken, the target either did not take the initial ultimatum seriously and/or had no intention of complying.

A pause could be viewed as another attempt at issuing an ultimatum. To be considered as such, the pause should contain the same elements required in an ultimatum. Specifically, the coercer must communicate the pause, how long it will last and what will occur after it ends. These elements create a demand or threat, ensure knowledge of the ultimatum, and issue a deadline. The ultimatum connection may be especially strong if the pause-ultimatum is tied to an increase in the level of violence as in a risk-oriented strategy. As Herman Kahn points out in his work *On Escalation*, this increase in violence may be in one of three ways: “increasing the intensity, widening the area, or compounding the escalation.”⁸⁴ Additionally, a pause could be used as an ultimatum might: to solidify internal domestic or international support to justify the actions taken or to place blame on the opponent for not preventing further actions.⁸⁵

If all the elements of an ultimatum are not present or communicated in conjunction with a pause, a sense of urgency may not be created in the target. This could be a missed opportunity for the coercer. Or, without a deadline, the target could view the unwillingness to set a deadline as a lack of resolve.⁸⁶ However, there may be valid reasons why the coercer does not want to make the pause an ultimatum. As Paul Lauren in his study of ultimata, writes: “An ultimatum by its very nature can produce a sense of tension, urgency, and finality. We must recognize, therefore, that,

⁸⁴ Increasing the intensity is a quantitative increase in what is already being done. Widening the conflict involves a geographical increase including expansion into an area that may have been considered a sanctuary. Compound escalation involves expanding outside of the local area such as attacking an ally. Kahn, Herman. *On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios*. [New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965], 4-6.

⁸⁵ Paul Gordon Lauren. “Ultimata and Coercive Diplomacy.” *International Studies Quarterly* 16, no. 2 (June 1972). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3013977> [accessed January 6, 2009], 157 and 159. Additionally, Lauren describes the multitude of reasons why an ultimatum would be issued as “impossible to fathom”. See text and note on pg 157 and text pg 159.

⁸⁶ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “The Strategy of Coercive Diplomacy: Refining Existing Theory to Post-Cold War Realities.” in *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases* edited by Lawrence Freedman. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998], 72.

unless these particular results are specifically desired—the serious risks involved in demands and threats—ultimata should not be utilized.”⁸⁷ These reasons for not creating an ultimatum could range from uncertainty in what the coercer’s next action will be to internal political considerations. Unfortunately, as will be discussed shortly, either of these scenarios surrounding a pause might impact the coercer’s creditability. A reluctant coercer, or a coercer who is uncomfortable with the pace of the conflict may find a pause that is not an ultimatum useful:

The urgent and final character of ultimata also often stand in flagrant contradiction with prudent crisis management, which requires that measures be slowed up and spaced out and that time be provided for reflection and ample communications between the contesting states. An ultimatum readily excites rather than inhibits tensions, and only decreases bargaining flexibility.⁸⁸

A pause, if not formulated as an ultimatum, could slow down the conflict enough to reach a resolution. Just as easily, a pause could be constructed as an ultimatum. The purpose of a pause as defined in this paper would be served by either of these constructs. Ultimatum or not, the pause is designed to achieve conflict resolution.

Success

The last consideration for a pause is what defines success. In response, there can be only one answer: did the pause accomplish what the coercer wanted? Did the target behave in the desired manner? As discussed, the pauses considered here are all implemented for the sole reason of bringing the coercion or conflict to an end. Therefore, the only definition of success for a pause is if the target capitulated to the demands of the coercer.

⁸⁷ Lauren Paul Gordon Lauren. “Ultimata and Coercive Diplomacy.” *International Studies Quarterly* 16, no. 2 (June 1972). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3013977> [accessed January 6, 2009], 156.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 163.

Why pauses are ill-advised

For all of the reasons presented, pauses can appear to be a viable option for the coercer's leadership. However, the promised outcome is more likely to be an illusion than reality. While every action taken by the coercer in a given situation in some manner impacts his ability to use coercion, a pause impacts coercion by delaying the defeat of the target and weakening the credibility of the coercer. In both cases the impact on coercion is such that the coercer's ability to use coercion is reduced.

Delay of Defeat

Rather than resolving the conflict, a pause extends the duration of the conflict. Quite simply, the pause extends the coercive engagement by delaying the target's defeat. When the situation is paused without an armistice or other resolution, the 'day-counter' tracking the length of the operation increases. However, the delay as discussed here is more than just a "freeze" in action extending the calendar. For when operations are paused, the target no longer feels the coercive effects of the action allowing two situations to occur internally to the target enabling him to increase resistance. First, the break created by the pause enables the target to reorganize, and second, the morale of the target's population can be increased. Both of these actions strengthen the target and enable him to resist the coercion longer, thus impacting the coercer's ability to coerce.

Any break in military action provides a respite for the target. Even if the coercer's goal for the pause is to give the target time to reflect on his actions, it is presumable that the target will "reflect" in a different manner—he is likely to use the time to reorganize for better resistance. As Pape states:

...any premature relaxation of military efforts gives the target state breathing space to restore its military capabilities....Thus, truces for the purpose of

facilitating negotiations are likely to be counterproductive, for they have the effect of placing the target state in a stronger position to resist the coercer's demands....⁸⁹

This restoration is not just limited to the repair and re-equipping of units. The respite also allows the target to reorganize his forces based on the type of military action the coercer is using and, if able, prepare counter-measures for the type of action the coercer is threatening after the pause.⁹⁰ Furthermore, this reorganization is not just limited to military forces. It can extend to all agencies of the government, including the restoration of communications or cooperation between agencies. Reorganization can also apply to civil defense which can then be improved based on the methods the coercer is using so the target can better serve its population. This allows the government to prepare its population for further conflict.

The restoration actions taken by the target's government during a pause reassure its military and population. However, it is not just the actions that provide reassurance—the pause itself provides encouragement to the population by giving hope directly to the population. The break allows time for the population to reflect on what has occurred. If the devastation or conditions feared prior to the conflict were not imposed, “the victim is likely to be pleasantly surprised, more resolved to resist, and thus less likely to be coerced.”⁹¹ This is especially likely to occur in situations where the coercer pauses before crossing thresholds such as found in an escalation or risk-based strategy. In a phased coercive operation, the level of violence or impact on the population may have been minimal up to the pause, thus providing them hope that the conflict will not match fears and that they can survive. Furthermore, these feelings within the

⁸⁹ Robert A. Pape *Bombing to Win*. [Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996], 31.

⁹⁰ Lambert, A.P.N. “Air Power and Coercion.” In *From Manoeuvre Warfare to Kosovo?* edited by John Andreas Olsen. The Norwegian Air Force Academy. n.d. <http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/1165/shear2.pdf> [accessed September 3, 2008], 252.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 247.

population can then feedback to the target government creating a situation where the government is likely to continue to resist.⁹²

The coercer pauses to allow the target to reflect in order to ultimately get the target to acquiesce to his demands. Unfortunately, the pause may cause just the opposite to occur. As the population and the government's hope, and consequently their resolve to resist the coercer's demands grow stronger, the likelihood of the target agreeing to the original demands decreases. Iklé discusses this consequence: "once the fighting has begun...it should continue only if, and so long as, both sides expect more from a later ending of the war than from an immediate settlement."⁹³ The coercer, who is pausing the fighting, does not expect further gains from further fighting and therefore does not wish to continue. The target, however, with his new hope of being able to resist or of still accomplishing a goal(s), is likely to continue to resist as he expects or retains hope for more from continuation than peace. Additionally, Iklé points out that once fighting has started, both sides often desire more from a settlement than they would have been willing to accept to avoid war.⁹⁴ Together this implies there are two things working against the coercer who pauses. First, as the pause increases hope and resolve, the target may expect to gain from further resistance something he could not have achieved prior to the conflict's outbreak. Secondly, once the fighting has started the target may change his goals. A pause to reconsider the coercer's demands then falls flat because the demands no longer align with what the target sees as at stake or the issue. Therefore once fighting has started, the demands the coercer entered the conflict with might be no longer applicable to the situation. Pausing to allow

⁹² Karl Mueller "Strategies of Coercion: Denial, Punishment, and the Future of Air Power." *Security Studies* 7, no. 3 (Spring 1998), 223.

⁹³ Fred Charles Iklé. *Every War Must End*. 2nd Rev. ed. [New York: Columbia University Press, 2005], 16.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 9. This point starts to address credibility in that the target may not believe that the coercer is willing to remain with his original demands without pressing for further gains. However, here the demand made of the target will be treated as unchanging during the course of coercion.

the target to reconsider the coercer's demands may only serve to further convince the target of the rightness of his aims for which he is fighting.

The argument can be made that a pause should not be used until the target has been hit hard and has taken significant damage. Under these circumstances, the target will realize his situation and accept the resolution. This may not be the case for two reasons. First, as Ikle illustrates, it is very hard to estimate the suffering and state of the opponent.⁹⁵ Second, even if a correct estimation of the target's situation were to be ascertained, the target may not realize the situation he himself is in.⁹⁶ It may take time for the target to fully comprehend his own situation. A pause may prevent that realization from occurring.

Overall a pause, rather than bringing the conflict to an end, may in reality extend the duration. First, it allows the target to reorganize its efforts. Second it can provide encouragement to the population. This encouragement can similarly embolden the government and consequently the target's objectives from the conflict, thereby increasing what they expect to gain. This then can increase the mismatch between the coercer's demands and what the target finds acceptable. Combined, each of these occurrences during a pause increases not only the target's ability to resist, but also his desire to resist the coercer's demands. Together, this delays the resolution of the conflict.

Weakening Credibility

Within Schelling's *Arms and Influence* lies a constant mention of the credibility of the threat. George reinforces this foundation saying that the use of force might be necessary "to demonstrate one's resolve to protect well-defined interests as well as the credibility of one's

⁹⁵ Fred Charles Ikle. *Every War Must End*. 2nd Rev. ed. [New York: Columbia University Press, 2005], 30.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 31-32.

determination.”⁹⁷ Further, it is not just the use of threats that must be credible in coercion but that the coercer will not press for additional demands or that any promised carrots will be delivered. Credibility is at the center of coercion and pauses directly impact the credibility of the coercer.

Before the relationship between pauses and credibility can be explored, credibility within coercion must be elaborated upon. Credibility is often defined in terms of believability or rationality.⁹⁸ As D. Marc Kilgour and Frank Zagare propose in “Credibility, Uncertainty and Deterrence”, it can also be defined in terms of the threat: a credible threat is “one that the threatener would prefer to execute at the time it is to be executed.”⁹⁹ Within current theory there are multiple methods to determine what the credibility is for a given situation. The first is to examine the costs associated with the implementation of a given threat or action.¹⁰⁰ To be credible, the costs to the coercer must be bearable. The costs and credibility may also depend on the value of the issue to the coercer.¹⁰¹ Costs can also be measured in a multitude of areas: resources, domestic support, and international standing as some of the most readily apparent. For example, a threat that “is perceived to result in a war of attrition is less credible than a threat of

⁹⁷ Alexander L. George, “Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics,” in *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, ed. Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds. 2nd Rev. ed. [Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc. 1994], 10.

⁹⁸ D. Mark Kilgour and Frank C. Zagare. “Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence.” *American Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 2 (May 1991). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111365> [accessed January 6, 2009], 305-307.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 308.

¹⁰⁰ Lawrence Freedman *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998], 24. This also returns to the most common method of analyzing coercion, cost/benefit analysis. See earlier discussion in Paper section of this paper.

¹⁰¹ Danilovic indicates that the source of credibility is the issue at stake rather than the credibility of the coercer directly. “Regional stakes as a source of inherent credibility of extended threats—is a powerful predictor of the choices that major powers make in their conflicts over nations.” Vesna Danilovic. “The Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence.” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 3 (June 2001). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3176149> [accessed January 6, 2009], 365.

force that is perceived to result in a swift, victorious campaign, because the costs of the former are much higher.”¹⁰² Threats for actions which visibly cost the coercer too much are not credible.

Another more traditional method of examining credibility is to review the coercer’s past record to determine what their response might be in the future.¹⁰³ Historically, does the coercer carry out his threats? Are his actions effective and does he keep his word? Will the coercer be able to maintain his resolve throughout the crisis? When evaluating these questions, it is important to remember that they must be answered from the viewpoint of the opponent. As George reminds us, it is what the opponent *believes* that is important.¹⁰⁴

Along with past perceptions, the coercer’s current actions must be taken into account. Here, high-level domestic debate within the coercer’s government can affect the overall impression of credibility. The type of commitment the coercer is making can also indicate how credible his threat is. As Byman and Waxman note, “low-risk, low-commitment measures” are “low-cost” and are often used when commitment is weak; this type of response can indicate that escalation is unlikely and lower the credibility of further threats.¹⁰⁵ Each of these facets of credibility is crucial and must be considered in any application of coercion. For “when an adversary doubts the coercer can escalate—or even sustain—operations, the perceived costs of

¹⁰² Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “The Strategy of Coercive Diplomacy: Refining Existing Theory to Post-Cold War Realities.” in *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases* edited by Lawrence Freedman. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998], 73.

¹⁰³ Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might*. [Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2002], 236. Vesna Danilovic argues that historical impacts to credibility are a valid predictor. However, Danilovic argues that historical situations are predictive only when they occurred in the same region. Vesna Danilovic. “The Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence.” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 3 (June 2001). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3176149> [accessed January 6, 2009], 366.

¹⁰⁴ Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, “Findings and Conclusions,” in *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, ed. Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds. 2nd Rev. ed. [Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc. 1994], 281.

¹⁰⁵ Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might*. [Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2002], 239.

defiance fall”.¹⁰⁶ If the target thinks he can afford to defy the coercer, then coercion is likely to fail.

Pauses play into the credibility of the coercer. As shown, it is important to remember that it is the credibility of the coercer from the vantage point of the target. It does not matter if the items that affect the credibility are true or even relevant to the current situation—it is how they appear to the target that matters. Considering this, there are three ways that using a pause can affect the coercer’s credibility. A pause can give the appearance of the coercer having restraints on the use of force. A pause can also indicate weakened resolve. Finally, it can make the previous use of force appear demonstrative. Individually or together these effects of a pause can weaken the credibility of the coercer and therefore reduce his ability to coerce.

Utilizing a pause can make it appear as if the coercer has restraints on his ability to use force. It may look as if the coercer paused because he is unable to continue, rather than that he chose to pause for his stated reasons. There could be a multitude of physical reasons that could give this impression: supply or maintenance issues, force losses, or weather. In the target’s eyes the pause could be a cover for the coercer’s lack of ability to progress. However, the risk to credibility moves beyond these types of misperceptions. Instead during a pause the risk to credibility comes from externally-visible internal debate within the coercer regarding the coercion and/or subsequent pause. Is there a faction that does not want to change or escalate operations? Is there dissension about the selected course of action? Are specific actions being eliminated as choices? Even the discussion of these items, regardless of the coercer’s intentions can affect the credibility as perceived by the target. Finally, the rules of engagement (ROE) may have restraints built into them that require authorization prior to further uses of force. This can make a pause appear as if it is not a conscious decision but instead the result of a requirement for authorization.

¹⁰⁶ Daniel L. Byman, Matthew C. Waxman, and Eric Larson. *Air Power as a Coercive Instrument*. [Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1999], 50.

This especially limits the coercer's ability to coerce in situations where it cannot apply more pressure without the approval of new ROE. Any of these scenarios visible to the target may hurt the credibility of the coercer thus impacting his ability to coerce.

As with the appearance of restraints damaging the credibility of the coercer's threats, any perceived lack of resolve can further impact credibility. Like many other credibility situations this can exist without a pause, however a pause magnifies and highlights its effects. This is because during a pause debate will often shift to debate over the restarting of offensive operations. If there is any debate about not resuming the coercive course of action, it can then appear as if the coercer does not have the resolve to continue. A visible move to extend the response deadline and consequently extend the pause can have the same effect. In a similar manner, a pause with no deadline can give the appearance of a lack of resolve and injure any credibility. Simply asking for negotiations can be seen as a weakness. Colonel K.R. Sorfleet notes that "the side that is seen to initiate the negotiations may be seen to be weakening in its resolve."¹⁰⁷ Earlier discussion indicated that a pause might be utilized because the conflict was progressing at too quick of a speed for the coercer—his objective with the pause is to slow the situation down in hopes of resolution. Unfortunately, when viewed from the target's perspective this situation can appear as if the coercer does not have the necessary resolve.

The credibility of the coercer can be impacted if the force used appears merely demonstrative or tentative rather than decisive. As with the other situations, this can be true regardless of whether there is a pause. However, as with resolve, a pause intensifies the effect. This perception is most likely to occur when a short-duration, low-cost, low-risk action is used.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ Sorfleet, K. R. "Conflict Termination: Implications for Military Officers." *Defence Studies* 1, no. 1 (Spring 2001). <http://web.ebscohost.com/lumen.cgsccarl.com/ehost/pdf?vid=3&hid=104&sid=e3b484ca-4146-4bda-b637-f2667bb366ee%40sessionmgr102> [accessed September 15, 2008], 56.

¹⁰⁸ Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might*. [Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2002], 239. This effect is similar to that mentioned previously in the discussion on costs.

It may, effectively, be a single strike against the target; however, the action is linked to the coercive demands rather than intended as a reprisal. The non-continuation of action afterwards encompasses all of the characteristics of a pause. If action was threatened, but this was the only result, in the mind of the target, the coercer may be bluffing. He may not have the resolve to take the threatened action. This can be especially true if there is no deadline re-presented after the action.¹⁰⁹ The target may simply believe that the coercive actions are over.

Coalitions, Pauses and Counter-coercion

The United States prefers to act as part of a coalition. Whether NATO, the United Nations, or a temporary coalition of like-minded nations formed over a specific issue, working through a coalition affects the application of coercion. A coalition must remain unified in purpose and agree on action to coerce. A pause creates the opportunity for this to disintegrate, or potentially for the target to interfere with counter-coercion efforts.

Coalitions in the use of coercion have been presented in the theory from the beginning. George and Simons directly addressed the crux of the issue in their construct of coercive diplomacy:

Coercive diplomacy is likely to be more difficult to carry out when it is employed by a coalition of states rather than by a single government. Although a coalition brings international pressure to bear on the target of diplomacy and can devote greater resources to the task, the unity and sense of purpose of a coalition may be fragile.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "The Strategy of Coercive Diplomacy: Refining Existing Theory to Post-Cold War Realities," in *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases* edited by Lawrence Freedman. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998], 72.

¹¹⁰ Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, "Findings and Conclusions," in *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, ed. Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds. 2nd Rev. ed. [Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc. 1994], 273.

When used by a coalition, more pressure can be applied to the target and it may possible create different ways to employ threats.¹¹¹ A coalition however, introduces a new variable into the mix: the ability of the coalition to remain intact and unified. Despite the difficulties, George and Simons do not advocate that employing coercion with a coalition is bad, but that coalitions have the potential to make the use of coercion harder by directly affecting the credibility of the threat. Within the coalition nations, each must individually deal with factors that can impact their credibility. Additionally, another layer is added in that the interrelations between the nations also impact credibility. Just as domestic conflict and debate affect the perception of a single nation's resolve so too does debate among coalition members. As Bruce Jentleson notes: "threats are less credible and carry less coercive potency when the target is not convinced that the sender can establish and maintain a coercive coalition."¹¹² If the adversary perceives this as true fragility, then the credibility of the coalition will be weakened.

The overall credibility of the threat is not the only aspect that is affected by internal debate within the coalition. More specifically, coalitions, whether intentionally or not, often put into place mechanisms that effectively limit the escalation of the threats or coercive actions. Byman and Waxman provide the best discussion on this topic. First, "squabbling among coalition members may result in inefficient decision-making and reduce the ability of the coalition to sustain and escalate military operations."¹¹³ If the coalition cannot effectively make decisions, then they are not an effective threat. Second, coalitions often create a "shared" command and control structure that "reduces the coercer's flexibility, makes escalation dominance more

¹¹¹ Such as different type of economic sanctions, threats from economic partners, or border nations etc.

¹¹² Bruce W. Jentleson, review of *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases* by Lawrence Freedman. *The American Political Science Review* 93, no. 4 (December 1999). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2586189> [accessed on January 6, 2009], 1013.

¹¹³ Daniel L. Byman, Matthew C. Waxman, and Eric Larson. *Air Power as a Coercive Instrument*. [Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1999], 88.

difficult to attain, and damages credibility”.¹¹⁴ An example is a structure where individual nations and/or the coalition as a whole must approve an action before it is taken, thereby impacting the time required for responses or the certainty of any response. Likewise, the structure may have limits that prevent additional authorizations of force, thereby presenting an image to the adversary where escalation is difficult.¹¹⁵ Aside from command and control structures, coalitions are likely to implement restrictive ROE.¹¹⁶ ROE often states what the coalition will or will not do and presents clear limits to the adversary on how far the coalition will escalate matters. Like ROE, a coalition may be operating under a mandate for the use of force that limits what force the coalition may or may not use. All of these issues together have a significant impact on the coalition’s credibility.

Coalitions, while acting in concert, are often not unified in belief or motivations. Despite a common interest that brought the nations together, they “frequently have different interests at stake and make different assessments of common threats.”¹¹⁷ While acting together, an individual nation’s interests will always remain dominant.¹¹⁸ As a consequence, the members of a coalition “rarely speak with a single voice—each member may at the same time communicate threats or signal messages to the adversary, perhaps in conflicting ways”.¹¹⁹ At various times, individual coalition members may present inconsistent messages to the opponent by sending

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 95. Escalation dominance is “the ability to increase the costs while denying the adversary opportunity to neutralize those costs or counterescalate”. They also note that the “capacity to escalate is perhaps the most common factor in successful coercive operations.” See also page 31.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 100.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 50.

¹¹⁷ Tim Zimmermann, “Coercive Diplomacy and Libya.” In *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 2nd Rev ed. edited by Alexander L. George and William E. Simons. [Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc. 1994], 219.

¹¹⁸ Silkett, Wayne A. “Alliance and Coalition Warfare.” *Parameters* 23, no. 2 (Summer 1993). <https://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/1993/silkett.htm> [accessed January 6, 2009].

¹¹⁹ Daniel L. Byman, Matthew C. Waxman, and Eric Larson. *Air Power as a Coercive Instrument*. [Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1999], 94.

communications that are more aligned with their national interests than that of the overall coalition. Worse yet, a nation may indicate reluctance or disagreement with coalition activities. Regardless of the purpose or actual occurrence, any contact a single nation may have with the opponent that does not reiterate the coalition message impacts the credibility of the coalition's threat.

Using coercion via a coalition increases not only the international support and available assets but creates multi-fold increases in opportunities for credibility to be impacted. Returning to Jakobsen's success condition of a strong leader in a coalition coercion operation, it becomes even more of a requirement. Jakobsen views a strong leader as essential to marshal the individual nations into a coalition and gain agreement on the use of force.¹²⁰ In light of the difficulty in keeping coalition credibility, a strong leader is also essential to maintain unity, focus and direction once coercive activities have started. Even small deviations from the coalition message can have large impacts on its credibility.

Pauses by a coalition

As shown, pauses have the ability to reduce the credibility of the individual coercer. In a coalition, the situation can be much worse as everything is multiplied. Coalitions not only have the same internal debate and restrictions as individual coercers, but they also must work with debate and restrictions among the coalition members. Worse, this debate may be available as public record, as in the case of the United Nations. The target's chances of perceiving a lack resolve and restraints increases. Finally, a pause may spur individual coalition members to have contact with the target in attempts to resolve the situation. This contact, even if done in the interests of the coalition will be flavored with the desires of the individual nation. This difference

¹²⁰ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "The Strategy of Coercive Diplomacy: Refining Existing Theory to Post-Cold War Realities." in *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases* edited by Lawrence Freedman. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998], 77.

may cause the target to draw conclusions about the unity of the coalition. Overall, the use of a pause by a coalition is a risky endeavor, likely to impact the credibility of the coalition.

Opportunity for Counter-coercion

The use of coercion is not a one-sided enterprise, here as anywhere, the enemy has a vote. As mentioned, coalitions can impose restrictions on actions via structure or ROE. Internally, individual nations impose restrictions on coercive action through what they will accept whether the limits are stated or not. An example is the United States' recent sensitivity to casualties. These limits have opened the door for adversaries to use counter-coercion strategies against coalition activities.¹²¹ Pauses present key opportunities for the target nation to employ counter-coercion.

Although they state there is not a clear delineation between groupings, Byman and Waxman have categorized counter-coercive strategies into three types: civilian suffering-based, coalition-fracturing, and casualty-generating.¹²² Civilian-suffering strategies refer the adversary's own population. Here, the adversary plays up the suffering and death among its population caused by coalition actions in order to eliminate support. While not necessarily effective at eroding support, Byman and Waxman note that often the coercing nation will often respond by placing limits and restrictions on its activities. This limits the coercer's ability to coerce in the future.¹²³ The second category, coalition-fracturing, involves the adversary attacking coalition cohesion. There is no single way to accomplish this. Adversary action can include anything from playing on an individual nation's lack of willingness by accepting some concessions to forcing escalation

¹²¹ Many aspects of this discussion are also applicable to individual nations employing coercion.

¹²² Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman. "Defeating US Coercion." *Survival* 41, no. 2 (Summer 1999). http://www18.georgetown.edu/data/people/dlb32/publication._31952.pdf [accessed September 3, 2008], 111.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 113. It is important to note that in their article Byman and Waxman are focused on US actions as part of a coalition in response to counter-coercion. Their categories and counter-coercion are based on US examples. These categories and actions would generally apply to any Western nation which is why they are included here without a US-only restriction for coalition counter-coercion discussions.

when certain members are not willing. The final counter-coercive strategy is to generate casualties in the coercer. While this strategy can simply test the resolve of the coercing coalition, it can also have coalition-fracturing effects if the distribution of casualties does not appear proportionate.¹²⁴ If effectively utilized by an adversary, a casualty generation strategy can affect the methods a coercer uses..¹²⁵ It could even drive a coalition member to no longer participate militarily.¹²⁶ Counter-coercive activities can affect the coalition unity, its actions, and its credibility. Such activities and the reaction to them can often be the difference between the success and failure of coercion.

Pauses can play right into the hands of a target that is using counter-coercion. Using the same categories as Byman and Waxman, pauses can aid the target in each. A target employing a civilian-suffering strategy is given opportunity to do so during a pause. Not only is the target government able to move freely and disseminate information within its nation, but other organizations such as the International Red Cross or United Nations may also report civilian impacts. Reactions to this will be monitored by the target and any restrictions that are visible can create a synergistic effect with already existing impacts to credibility with a pause. This is especially the case if the pause was implemented in a risk-scenario with escalation threatened for failure to comply. Restrictions will further reduce the credibility of further threat. The remaining two strategies, coalition-fracturing and casualty-generation are aided by pauses in that a target will be given time to evaluate courses of action with little distractions. As Paul Dobb writes in his

¹²⁴ Ibid., 116.

¹²⁵ Karl Mueller "Strategies of Coercion: Denial, Punishment, and the Future of Air Power." *Security Studies* 7, no. 3 (Spring 1998), 226. Byman and Waxman also address this issue in terms of how much risk the coercer is willing to take. For example, accepting only low-risk methods such as airpower and eschewing ground troops. Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman. "Defeating US Coercion." *Survival* 41, no. 2 (Summer 1999). http://www18.georgetown.edu/data/people/dlb32/publication._31952.pdf [accessed September 3, 2008], 116.

¹²⁶ Military versus diplomatic member of coalition derived from Dobb. Spain is an example of this during the U.S War on Terror. Paul Dobb, "The Future of International Coalitions: How Useful? How Manageable?" *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (Spring 2002), 135.

examination of the future usefulness of coalitions, “a coalition is never stronger than its weakest link.”¹²⁷ During a pause, the target can pin-point that weak link. He will have time to evaluate coalition cohesion and member resolve, have opportunities to meet with envoys or reach out to nations, and have time to plan. The pause does not create any new forms of counter-coercion but it can magnify opportunities that already exist.

CONCLUSION

But once a decision to employ some degree of force has been made, and the purpose clarified, our government must have the clear mandate to carry out, and continue to carry out, that decision until the purpose has been achieved.
—Caspar W. Weinberger, “The Uses of Military Power”

In 1984 Caspar Weinberger laid out what would become known as the Weinberger Doctrine when he said the above words to the National Press Club.¹²⁸ His resolve to continue the fight until its purpose has been achieved matches coercion theory. As shown, stopping early, even to pause in hopes of ending the conflict is counterproductive and can only serve to make the situation more difficult to resolve.

Pauses historically have been a glossed-over aspect of coercion. Defined here as a temporary halt to offensive operations for the purpose of bringing about conflict resolution, pauses have been acknowledged, but not analyzed for their impact. There are many reasons why a coercer may implement a pause: allow reflection or negotiation time, slow the pace of the conflict, reward the target for meeting some demands, or issue a further ultimatum, especially prior to escalation. Whatever the reason, the pause is only successful if the target capitulates to the coercer’s demands.

¹²⁷ Paul Dobb, “The Future of International Coalitions: How Useful? How Manageable?” *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (Spring 2002), 136.

¹²⁸ It would later also be known as the Powell Doctrine. Caspar W. Weinberger, “The Uses of Military Power” National Press Club, Washington, D.C. Nov. 28, 1984 <http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2004/January%202004/0104keeperfull.pdf> [accessed January 24, 2009].

This research indicates the impact of a pause can be significant on a coercer's ability to use coercion. Specifically, pauses appear to have negative effects on the use of coercion. They can delay the defeat of the target directly by allowing him time to reorganize and indirectly by boosting the target's morale thereby increasing, not decreasing, his will to fight. Pauses also negatively impact the credibility of the coercer by indicating that he is restrained in his use of force, lacking resolve, or inclined to a demonstrative use of force only. All of these effects risk being magnified in an operation where a coalition is the coercer. Finally, pauses create opportunities for the target to counter-coerce the coercer.

The key to understanding these effects of a pause is that they are seen through the eyes of the target. It is what he perceives, real or not, that matters. If he believes the coercer is pausing because he lacks resolve, then the pause is likely to not succeed. If the target is encouraged because the force used prior to the pause was less than expected, then the target may not react to a pause thinking he can survive. It is what is in the target's mind that matters—not reality. A pause impacts the target's reality in a direction the coercer does not desire.

Future case-study analysis should focus on the reasons for and the effects of pausing in the use of coercion in order to determine the impact of the target's reactions to the pause. Pending the results of such a study, policy-makers should be wary when contemplating pausing in the use of coercion. Theory indicates that such a pause will likely be counterproductive. Accordingly, policy-makers need to be watchful and plan ahead for the consequences if they are going to pause in the use of coercion.

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